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Abstract 
 One of the puzzling phenomena recently had been the sudden drop of external confidence 
in five Asian economies: South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines.  The 
persistence, wide-impact, and underlying causes of this Asian crisis sets itself apart from the 
earlier Chilean and Mexican experiences.  After discussing various explanations of this crisis, 
low marginal productivity of capital, Minsky's financial instability hypothesis, fixed exchange 
rates and un-hedged borrowings, ‘push’ factors and rise in country risk, regionalization and 
contagion, and institutional factors, it compares it to the Chilean and Mexican Crises.  It 
emphasizes the need for the developing countries to strengthen their institutions at the same pace 
as they liberalize their financial sector and open-up their capital accounts. 
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Introduction 
One of the puzzling phenomena recently had been the sudden drop of external confidence in five 
Asian economies: South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. This lack of 
faith spread in varying degrees to other ‘miracle economies’ like Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong 
Kong. The abrupt change in fortunes was shocking because even as late as June 1997, policy 
makers and economists were trying to imitate these miracle economies. Now, the attempt is to 
learn how to avoid such a pointed discontinuity in economic performance. 
 Given the relative novelty of this crisis, theoretical analysis of this crisis is relatively 
sparse. Some parallels to the Mexican crisis of 1994-95 and the Chilean crisis of 1982-84 can be 
found. All these crises were accentuated by sharp reversal in the non-traditional external 
financing sector, viz. external financing not mediated or guaranteed by governments. Yet, as we 
shall see below, the persistence, wide-impact, and underlying causes of the Asian crisis sets itself 
apart from the earlier Chilean and Mexican experiences. 
Crises and the Asian Crisis 
Surveying crises faced by developing countries since 1960, Bruno (1996) distinguishes between 
three kinds of economic crises: inflation, debt, and growth. Inflation crisis is defined as high 
inflation followed by stabilization. High inflation means 40 percent annual inflation for at least 
two years in a row. Stabilization implies returning below that threshold for at least two years in a 
row. On the other hand, countries rescheduling their private debt at least once since 1980 are said 
to be facing debt crisis. Lastly, at least three consecutive years of decline in economic activity 
(cumulating to a drop of at least 9 percent in GDP) is defined as growth crisis. We present data 
on the recent Asian crisis to see whether these countries faced any of these crisis.1 
 Asian crisis manifests itself first by a sharp decline in exchange rates and asset values. 
The IMF, the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and individual countries like Japan had 
committed $117.7b to Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand by August 31, 1997. Also, Hong Kong has 
a large stock of foreign reserves, and has one of the most liberal and open financial markets in 
the world with its currency's long-standing peg to the U.S. dollar. Yet, the financial markets in 
Korea and Hong Kong suffered great turbulence in October 1997 (following Taiwan's 
depreciation of its new dollar by 10 percent). 
           Tables 6.1 and 6.2 present information on the decline in exchange rates and stock indices, 
respectively, in East Asian countries since July 1, 1997. Five countries stand out as having 
extreme exchange rate and stock value depreciations. These are Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand.2  Out of these five economies, Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea had to 
reschedule their private debt. Although inflation was expected to increase in these countries due 
to sharp exchange rate depreciation, it has remained moderate due to outflow of $17.2b), and a 
decline of $15.8b in non-bank private creditors, and a decrease of $15.4b in portfolio equity 
investment (from an inflow of $13.9b to an outflow of $1.5b). These three declines account for 
72 percent, 15 percent, and 14 percent, respectively, of the decrease in private inflows to the five 
Asian countries. The severe reversal of commercial bank and other private lending, rather than 
the reverse flow of securitized international finance, thus predominantly explains the sharp 
declines in the exchange rates and in other asset values in these countries. 
 
 
Financial and Capital Account Liberalization 
In this section, we briefly summarize some of the recent work on financial and/or capital account 
liberalization both in general and that in Asia. We first note that liberalizations are often partial 
and incremental. Till the recent imposition of controls by Hong Kong and Malaysia, each year 
more and more emerging markets were moving slowly but steadily towards greater liberalization 
of their capital accounts and financial sectors.3 Few emerging markets had full liberalization. 
Nevertheless, fairly large capital movements may take place even with partial and incomplete 
liberalization. 
 Demirglic-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) study a large panel data set covering 53 
industrial and developing economies during 1980-95. During this period the banking sector was 
increasingly liberalized. Yet, the frequency of systematic banking problems markedly increased, 
raising the possibility that greater fragility is a consequence of liberalization. Although financial 
fragility is affected by a host of factors, financial liberalization can be seen to have a negative 
effect on banking sector stability. Their findings strongly suggest that institutional development 
and the regulatory framework needed for financial markets to operate efficiently should be 
emphasized early in the liberalization process. There appears to be a consensus that ending 
financial repression is a precondition for freeing capital accounts. Yet, few authors have 
investigated the interaction between these two sectors after they are liberalized. One exception is 
Goldfajn and Valdes (1997) who through a three-period, three-agents (investors, financial 
intermediaries, and central bank) model show that intermediaries’ role of transforming maturities 
results in larger movements of capital and higher probability of crisis. Haggard and Maxfield 
(1996), and Park (1994) also caution about rapid financial and capital account liberalization, 
particularly in a regime of fixed exchange rates. On the other hand, Bartolini and Drazen (1997) 
model a situation of foreign uncertainty about government's attitude towards taxation of capital. 
In this situation, a liberal capital outflow policy sends a signal of future favorable policies 
towards foreign investment and hence may trigger a capital inflow. This conclusion is supported 
by Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez (1993) who report that portfolio adjustments following capital 
account liberalization have often led to a net capital inflow and real exchange rate appreciation. 
To summarize, these studies tell us that though capital account liberalization generally leads to a 
net capital inflow, fixed exchange rates may not be viable when the capital account is liberalized. 
Nevertheless, financial and capital markets interaction causes a large movement of capital and a 
greater probability of crisis. 
Asian Financial and Capital Account Liberalization 
Now we turn to studies of financial and capital account liberalization in the five affected Asian 
countries. Binhadi (1994) reports that Indonesia had liberalized the exchange rates and the 
capital account in 1970 while tax reform and trade and industry deregulation began only in the 
second half of eighties. In June 1983, determination of interest rates was left to each bank’s 
discretion. Before October 1988, the private banks and foreign banks were not permitted to enter 
the banking sector. Kiriwat (1994) finds that after achieving fiscal balance and export success, 
the financial authorities in Thailand removed all interest rate ceilings gradually between 1989 to 
1992. At the same time, the authorities felt that the securities market needed to be strengthened 
to provide both a counterweight to the power of large banks and give corporate managers 
instruments to manage their cash flow and risk. 
 Zialcita (1994) studies external account liberalization in the Philippines. The Philippines 
had full current account convertibility in 1981-82, but capital account restrictions remained 
pervasive. Following the balance of payments crisis and debt moratorium of October 1983, a 
floating regime was established. In 1991, the Philippines permitted full inflow of capital and 
limited outflow capital to $1m per investor per year. Dooley (1994) notes that capital account 
liberalization in Malaysia and Indonesia (and in Chile and Mexico) was followed by large 
inflows of foreign capital. In addition to the usual ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors, speculative bubbles 
and government policies were behind these inflows. Poorly informed private investors were 
merely following a ‘follow the leader’ game.4  Government policies of maintaining fixed 
exchange rates obviated the exchange rate risk. Though private investors/creditors expected the 
bubble to burst, they expected the government or the IMF to bail them out since they (IMF or the 
government) would not like the depositors hurt. Thus, he had noted in 1994 that capital inflows 
in some Asian countries involved moral hazard. 
 Johnston, Darbar, and Echeverria (1997) provide detailed information on the sequence 
and incremental nature of reforms of domestic and external transactions in Indonesia, Korea, and 
Thailand (and Chile) for the 1985-96 period. This information is reviewed against the balance of 
payments developments and macroeconomic and exchange rate policies in these countries. They 
favor a coordinated and comprehensive approach to reforms of these two sectors. They also 
suggest that managing capital flows successfully depends critically on the overall incentive-
structure causing these flows and the stage of development of the domestic financial system. 
            Thus, the affected Asian countries mostly retained fixed exchange rates and had fairly 
liberal financial and capital sectors in place by 1997. However, they lacked either awareness or 
will/expertise to adequately supervise or regulate the financial sectors. 
Asian Crisis: Diagnosis and Prognosis 
Asian countries’ economic performance was being held up as a model for other countries as late 
as April 1997. For example, Ito (1997), using the ‘flying geese’ hypothesis, identifies Japan, 
flying in front, flanked by Hong Kong and Singapore, and followed by Korea and Taiwan as 
miracle economies. He noted that Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines were just 
behind them in economic success. For example, during the thirty years preceding the crisis, per 
capita real income levels increased tenfold in Korea, fivefold in Thailand and fourfold in 
Malaysia. All these countries had high savings and investment rates, were applying modern 
scientific thought and technology to industry, and had highly trained labor forces. A major crisis 
in these economies begs for answers. We present the following explanations. 
Low Marginal Productivity of Capital 
One reason for the Asian crisis is that marginal productivity of capital had fallen quite low in 
these countries by 1997. Young (1994, 1995), Kim and Lau (1994), and Krugman (1994) argue 
that most of East Asia’s remarkable success preceding those years was attributable to factor 
accumulation (including capital accumulation) rather than to miraculous achievements in 
productivity. An implication is that East Asia had excessive investment whose marginal 
productivity had substantially fallen. Investors’ sudden realization of this low return on real 
investment in the affected countries was one cause of the Asian crisis. This structural problem 
was not widely recognized before 1997. 
Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis 
The Asian experience lends some support to Minsky's (1986) financial instability hypothesis that 
a country's economic success carries the seeds of a later financial crisis. Minsky argued that 
economic booms cause both lenders and borrowers to take risks they otherwise would not. Such 
risk taking results in financial instability as borrowers seek cash to finance acquisition of 
additional capital goods and lenders willingly provide it. Any shock to the system can easily 
push the borrowers into insolvency. Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1998) find some evidence of this 
financial instability in Asia. Asian countries had a higher than average relationship between 
banking sector distress and credit growth. They also had excessive buildup in the foreign 
liabilities of the banking sector. 
Fixed Exchange Rates and Un-Hedged Borrowings 
Washington-institutions (IMF and the U.S. Treasury) have stressed the maintenance of relatively 
fixed exchange rates as one of the causes of the crisis. The exchange-rate confidence, solvency, 
and debt crises that erupted in the affected economies in mid-1997 was not a result of the usual 
macroeconomic imbalances. The fixed-exchange rates led banks and corporations in the affected 
countries to borrow large amounts of short-term, foreign currency denominated unhedged 
foreign capital that was used to finance poor quality investments. 
‘Push’ Factors and Rise in Country Risk 
The preceding explanation raises the question why fully rational lenders/investors lent and 
invested in such low-quality investments. It appears that ‘push’ factors, viz. low rates of return 
available to financial institutions in Japan and the U.S., and vent of surplus of investible funds 
for whatever diversification existed, combined with optimistic expectations were responsible for 
flows to these countries. Yet, in the middle of 1997, the lenders/investors revised their return-
expectations downwards and risk-expectations upwards and suddenly pulled their funds back. 
             Chinn and Maloney (1998) for Korea and Taiwan, and Maloney (1997) for Chile find 
that in spite of capital account liberalization, covered interest parity (CIP) did not hold for these 
countries. Covered interest parity has been used as a test of capital accounts’ integration. These 
countries’ capital markets therefore were not well integrated with world markets. However, CIP 
only adjusts for expectations of exchange rate depreciation. One should instead argue that these 
countries had higher ‘country-risk.’ In the middle of 1997, country-risk of the East Asian 
economies suddenly increased. Nevertheless, their real interest rates did not rise either speedily 
or sufficiently. The result was capital flight and currency and asset-value crises. 
Regionalization and Contagion 
The conventional wisdom is that the 1990s have been ‘the decade of globalization.’ This 
preconception does not recognize the simultaneous increase in regional linkages. During the past 
decade, regional economic links have intensified more than extra-regional ones. Trade among 
industrial countries in different regions has declined in relative terms while linkages between 
developed and emerging market economies within regions have increased. In addition, intra-
regional trade among emerging market countries has been the fastest-growing category of all. 
For example; despite strong export to non-Asian trading partners, intra-Asian trade (among 
developing countries has grown even more rapidly so that intra-regional exports as a proportion 
of total exports increased as illustrated by Table 6.4. The contagion to the other Asian countries 
can be partly explained by the recognition of these regional links by investors. 
Institutional Factors 
The Asian crisis shows that there are important differences between financial and other markets. 
These differences suggest that although there is a presumption that trade liberalization is welfare-
enhancing, full liberalization of financial markets may well not be because it is associated with a 
higher probability of crisis  Financial markets will promote growth only if they have sturdy 
institutions to help them do their work, including strong government regulation, effective laws, 
and vigilant enforcement. The affected Asian countries had largely liberalized their financial and 
capital account sectors even though they lacked ·such sturdy institutions. 
 
 
Comparison to the Chilean and Mexican Crises 
Chile: Chile is one country where financial liberalization was taken to mean no regulation. Chile 
privatized its banks and liberalized exchange rates in 1974 Capital controls were completely 
removed by 1980. During this period several banks and whole saving and loan system collapsed. 
Some banks had no capital and the incidence of connected lending within financial-industrial 
groups was high.  Recession and serious deterioration in the terms of trade in early 1980s led to 
large reversals of capital flows. The bad debts of banks accelerated rapidly because of exchange 
rate and interest rate-lined losses. 
 The Chilean crisis of early 1980s, like the Asian crisis, was also manifested by a reversal 
of private capital flows. Still, it differs from the Asian crisis in the following ways: First, unlike 
the affected Asian countries, Chile’s banking and financial sector was already on the verge of 
collapse before the crisis. Secondly the Chilean crisis was triggered by events in the real sector, 
viz. recession and sharp deterioration in the terms of trade. On the other hand, the Asian crisis 
started with the sudden fall in confidence in Thai Baht's exchange value. 
 Mexico: Mexico was a large recipient of foreign capital in the period preceding its 1994-
95 crisis. In fact, $104b of capital flowed into the country between 1990 and 1994 - it was 20 
percent of total capital flows to developing countries during this period. However, most of this 
capital consisted of portfolio equity investment. None of the affected Asian countries 
experienced such large capital inflows preceding the crisis. Also, the dominant equity investment 
in these countries was direct rather than portfolio. Direct flows to Asian countries did not reverse 
during the crisis years. It was largely the reversal of short-term bank lending that characterizes 
the Asian crisis. 
 
 As stated above, one reason for the Asian crisis was the excessive boom in real 
investment in these countries. The boom had been going on for decades. The situation in Mexico 
was different. For ten years preceding 1989, Mexico experienced low or negligible growth and 
high inflation. From 1989 to 1994, Mexico’s average GDP growth rate was 3.9 percent, and, 
inflation in 1993 fell to single digit levels for the first time in over 20 years. Thus, Mexico was 
not suffering from either a long boom in investment that had reduced the marginal productivity 
of capital in 1994 or from Minsky’s financial instability in the last phase of a boom. Rather it 
was political (and suspected criminal) events revealed in December 1994) that caused the 
Mexican crisis. After the rescue package was put together, the crisis was quickly contained. The 
Asian crisis proved to be so enduring because it has demonstrated some structural problems of 
these economies.5, 6 
Conclusions 
The return on financial investments in the U.S. (at least of the fixed income type) and Japan have 
been quite low. One source of these funds are prodigious Japanese savings coupled with its 
negligible (till recently) growth. For U.S., the wealth effects due to the 1990s boom, rising 
income inequality, and the maturing of the baby-boomers all provide a ‘push’ for new markets. 
These factors provide great opportunities for developing countries as a destination for capital 
flows. However, the Asian crisis, like the Mexican crisis of 1994-95, also shows the challenge of 
sustaining the confidence of foreign investors. Any unexpected development/shock can cause 
panic and ‘run’ on the country. Thus, developing countries ought to strengthen their institutions 
at the same pace as they liberalize their financial sector and open-up their capital accounts. The 
theoretical models discussed in this paper assume open economies, full information, and efficient 
global financial markets. The former two assumptions are particularly inappropriate for 
developing countries. In the 1980s, the information asymmetry between local firms/banks and 
foreign investors about local business conditions in Latin America was mitigated by government 
guarantees to foreign investors. Yet, as the experience of the ‘lost decade’ of 1980s showed, even 
sovereigns’ may default. Imperfect information models are needed as alternatives to the current 
full-information open-economy models. Furthermore there is a need for additional studies of the 
interaction of financial and capital account liberalization both to explain the Asian crisis and to 
understand this increasingly important part of modem economies. 
  
Notes 
1. Other parts of the world have not been immune from contagion from the Asian crisis, the 
Russian economy was performing poorly in any case. But, Latin-American economies, including 
Brazil, arguably may have avoided their woes in the absence of contagion from the Asian crisis. 
This crisis has clearly exacerbated economic problems in many parts of the world. For 
example, the following economies (in addition to the five affected countries) have experienced 
recession (fall in output for two consecutive quarters) since the Asian crisis: Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Japan, Germany, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, South Africa, Romania, 
Ukraine, Turkey, and the Czech Republic. See, the World Bank (1999) and International Financial 
Statistics, various monthly issues. This crisis and its aftermath placed the global real economy to 
one of its greatest perils since the Great Depression. 
2. The decline in real estate prices in these economies is equally sharp. 
3. Please see various monthly issues of the International Financial Statistics for these data. 
4. The gradual liberalization from 1985 to 1996 of monetary controls and financial system, exchange 
system, trade and capital flows for Chile, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand is brought-out very clearly 
by Johnston, Darbar, and Echeverria (1997). 
5. The ‘push’ factors (external or exogenous developments) like low rates of return in investing 
countries and investors’ desire for diversification may be contrasted from ‘pull’ factors like policy 
reforms, regulatory changes, and a more attractive investment climate in the borrowing countries. 
See Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993) for the use of these terms. 
6. Mexico overcame its structural problems by undertaking reforms during the ‘lost decade’ of the 
1980s and during early 1990s. 
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Data 
Table 6.1 Depreciation in Asian Exchange Rates 
 
 Percent change from: 
 
July 1, 1997 
to 
Dec. 31, 1997 
Dec. 31, 1997 
to 
May 1, 1998 
July 1, 1997 
to  
May 1, 1998 
 
Indonesia 
-55.8 -31.2 -69.6 
Korea -47.5 26.7 -33.5 
Malaysia -35.2 5.7 -31.5 
Philippines -34.5 .6 -34.9 
Thailand -47.6 21.2 -36.5 
Japan -11.9 -1.9 -13.6 
China .1 .4 .5 
Hong Kong 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Taiwan 15.2 -.8 -15.8 
Singapore -15.4 7.0 -9.5 
 
Note: Calculated from various issues of the IMF's International Financial Statistics. 
Source: Bloomberg Financial Services, L.P 
 
Table 6.2 Depreciation in Asian Stock Indices 
 
 Percent change from: 
 
July 1, 1997 
to 
Dec. 31, 1997 
Dec. 31, 1997 
to 
May 1, 1998 
July 1, 1997 
to  
May 1, 1998 
Indonesia -45.4 14.5 -37.0 
Korea -51.6 11.9 -45.8 
Malaysia -45.7 6.2 -42.3 
Philippines -32.4 16.7 -21.1 
Thailand -35.7 12.7 -27.5 
Japan -24.4 2.5 -22.6 
China 1.5 13.7 12.0 
Hong Kong -28.6 -3.5 31.0 
Taiwan -9.5 1.9 -7.7 
Singapore -13.8 -8.9 -21.3 
 
Source: Bloomberg Financial Services, L.P. 
  
Table 6.3 External Financing in Five Asian Economies (Billions of Dollars) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999f 
Current account balance -40.6 -54.4 -26.8 69.4 46.3 
External financing, net 89.0 103,2 27.5 -12.9 10.8 
Private flows, net 86.4 106.4 -0.8 -38.6 5.1 
Equity investment, net 15.3 18.6 4.4 14.2 25.2 
Direct, net 4.2 4.7 5.9 9.9 11.9 
Portfolio, net 11.0 13.9 -1.5 4.3 13.2 
Private creditors, net 71.2 87,8 -5.2 -52.7 -20.0 
Commercial banks, net 58.6 59.9 -17.2 -48.3 -18.7 
Nonbanks, net 12.6 27.8 12.0 -4.4 -1.3 
 
Official flows, net 2.6 -3.2 28.3 25.6 5.7 
Int’l financial institutions -0.4 -2.0 22.5 19.4 -3.3 
Bilateral creditors 3.0 -1.3 5.7 6.3 9.0 
Resident lending/other, net2 -34.3 -31.9 -31.3 -15.1 -13.5 
Reserves (- = increase) -14.1 -16.9 30.7 -41.3 -43.6 
 
Source: Institute of International Finance. 
 
Table 6.4  Trade among developing countries (intraregional exports as a  
  percentage of total exports) 
 
 1987 1998 
Within Asia 27.4 38.3 
Within Latin America 15.2 22.0 
Within Europe 34.6 36.4 
Within Africa 5.8 11.9 
 
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics 1996-Yearbook and June 1999-Quarterly. 
 
